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In this paper we reconsider the idea of an earnings-related pension system with reserves invested 
in indexed government bonds as a mechanism to both ensure financial sustainability and 
improve security.  The paper starts by reviewing the characterization of the sustainable rate of 
return of an earnings-related pension system with pay-as-you-go financing.  We show that 
current proxies for the sustainable rate, including the Swedish “gyroscope”, are not stable and 
propose an alternative measure that depends on the growth of the buffer-stock and the pay-as-
you-go asset.  Using a simple one-sector macroeconomic model that embeds a notional account 
pension system we then show how GDP indexed government bonds, if combined with the right 
measure for the sustainable rate of return on contributions, could be used to generate a 
sustainable and secure earnings-related pension system, without becoming a fiscal burden.  The 
proposal is particularly attractive for countries considering reforms to earnings-related systems 
that have accumulated a large implicit pension debt.  In this case, the government bonds allow 
the financing of this debt in a transparent way.  The proposed mechanism can also facilitate the 
transition to a fully-funded pension system when the government bonds are allowed to be 
traded.   
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A majority of mandatory public pension systems in the world involve an 
earnings-related (ER) scheme with “pay-as-you-go” financing.  By earnings-related we 
refer to systems where the pension is essentially a function of past earnings.  Three main 
designs can be identified:  standard defined benefit systems, points systems, and 
notional account systems; mathematically, the three benefit formulas are equivalent.3  By 
pay-as-you-go we imply that pensions are financed essentially out of current 
contributions.  Many of the systems can have reserves, but these act rather as a “buffer 
stock” to smooth adjustments to benefits or contribution rates that become necessary as 
a result of unexpected macroeconomic and/or demographic shocks or the gradual 
maturation of the system. 
Surprisingly, in most cases, ER systems do not meet basic principles in terms of 
design to ensure financial sustainability, minimize distortions in labor supply and 
savings decisions, and to avoid arbitrary -- often regressive -- redistributions of income.  
Even in countries that have recently adopted notional account schemes, which deal with 
issues related to incentives and equity, the problem of financial sustainability has not 
been fully resolved.  
 The focus of this paper is on this last problem:  the financial sustainability of the 
scheme.  It is well known that whether an ER system is financially self-sustainable or not 
depends on the implicit rate of return (IRR) that it pays on contributions.  If the IRR is 
too high, the system becomes insolvent; if the IRR is too low the system penalizes 
workers.  Until recently, it was common to refer to the growth rate of the covered wage 
bill as the appropriate measure of the IRR.  This is the correct measure, however, only in 
restrictive theoretical settings (e.g., two overlapping generation models in steady state).  
Reality is more complex and while the growth rate of the covered wage bill can be a 
good proxy under some circumstances, other factors such as retirement patterns, 
mortality rates, and the age-sex composition of the plan members are important as well. 
                                                 
3 For discussions in terms of design and implementation of Notional Account systems see Holzmann and 
Palmer (2005), for the equivalence of benefit formulas see Robalino et al. (2005).   3
  Settergren and Mikula (2005) proposed a measure of the sustainable IRR that 
inspires the “automatic balancing mechanism” in the current Swedish Notional Account 
pension system.  It depends on the growth rate of the average wage, the growth rate of 
reserves, and the so called “turnover duration” (TD) of the system.  The TD is supposed 
to capture the average length of time that a monetary unit of contribution remains in the 
system.  The authors argue that the TD multiplied by total contributions at a given point 
in time provides an estimate of the pension liability that can be supported by the system.  
We argue, however, that this measure can be arbitrary and we show that it is not bullet 
proof either; the system can deviate from long term equilibrium in the presence of 
shocks to wages and coverage rates.4   
Another approach has been recently proposed in Valdez-Prieto (2005a) and 
applied to the case of the United States in Valdez-Prieto (2005b).  The idea is to grant to 
the pension fund property rights over the pay-as-you-go asset (the present value of 
future contributions net of pension rights accruing from these contribution) through 
Covered Wage Bill Bonds (CWB) – which are issued by the pension fund not the 
government.  Investors in the bonds basically acquire rights over part of future 
contributions.  These bonds do not have maturities and investors assume 100 percent of 
the loss if future revenues fall below expectations.  Ultimately the bonds act more as 
equity.  The operation requires making the implicit tax on contributions (the pay-as-you-
go asset) explicit.5  Then, when the bonds are traded, their resulting yields become the 
appropriate rate of return on contributions to guarantee financial sustainability.  As 
pointed out by the author himself, however, the necessary arrangements to issue and 
trade these bonds could be quite complex, particularly for middle and low-income 
countries.  The system’s resilience to unexpected changes in survival probabilities is also 
a cause of concern.   
In this paper we propose an alternative design for financially sustainable and 
secure ER systems that combines a revised formula for the sustainable IRR and the use 
                                                 
4 There are, of course, various differences between the system description in the theoretical paper of 
Settergren and Mikula (2005) and the actual formulas that the Swedish pension system applies. Although 
the Swedish Pension System Annual Report includes a description of the system’s rules, the authors needed 
to consult with Ole Settergren on the detailed indexation rules.  The projections in this paper rely on the 
information gained from the correspondence with Ole Settergren. 
5 The “pay-as-you-go asset” concept is defined later in this paper. For additional discussions see Valdez-
Prieto (2005a).   4
of government indexed bonds – an idea first introduced by Buchanan (1968).  In the 
proposed design the latter can achieve the following objectives:  (i) eliminate the risk of 
mismanagement of the funds that inevitably accumulate during the first couple of 
decades, and which are necessary to finance pensions when the system matures; (ii) 
improve fiscal management by making the implicit liabilities of the system explicit; (iii) 
improve incentives for policymakers to respect rules that ensure the long-term financial 
sustainability of the ER system; (iv) facilitate pension reform in countries where the ER 
system has accumulated a large implicit pension debt; and (v) facilitate the transition to 
a funded scheme if the government bonds, at some point in time, are allowed to be 
traded.  We will see, however, that simply introducing government bonds does not 
guarantee financial sustainability.  This is why at the same time the rules for calculating 
the IRR need to be reviewed.    
While the proposed design could apply to any type of ER system, the focus here 
is on the Notional Account system.  This is because the benefit formula in the NA system 
provides a logical and more transparent link between contributions, the IRR, and 
benefits, and it makes it easier to calculate and track pension liabilities (see Lindeman et 
al., 2006).   
The paper is organized in 5 sections.  Section 2 starts by characterizing the 
sustainable rate of return of an ER system, while showing the limitations of the Swedish 
approach and proposing an alternative measure.  Section 3 assesses the robustness of 
alternative proxies for the sustainable IRR on the basis of a simple macroeconomic 
model that incorporates a notional account system.  Section 4 is concerned with the 
operationalization of government indexed bonds and the assessment of fiscal impacts.  
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main results of the analysis and the policy 
implications.  A formal description of the macroeconomic model and derivations of 
various mathematical results are presented in the Appendices. 
 
2. The Sustainable Rate of Return of an ER System 
  
We start by defining the financing gap of an ER pension system operating in the 
steady state.  This financing gap is defined as:   5
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where f is the minimum age of enrollment in the system; L is the maximum age that an 
individual biologically can live; N(a) is the number of plan members born a years ago; ϕ 
is the growth rate of the population of age 0 (which reflects fertility rates); l(a) is the 
survival probability to age a; R(b) is the share of the cohort that is retired by age b; P(b) is 
the average pension of all individuals in the cohort retired by age b; β is the contribution 
rate to the system; Wt is the average covered wage at time t; w(.) is the age profile of 
wages; g is the growth rate of the average covered wage; ρ is the discount rate (which in 
this case should reflect the cost of capital); C(a)t is the average virtual capital 
accumulated by an individual of cohort a at time t; r* is the rate used to revalorize wages 
and index pensions (the IRR on contributions); and G(.) is the “G factor” to transform the 
virtual capital into an annuity, which depends on the age of retirement, survival 
probabilities, and in this case the sustainable rate of return on contributions.6 
The sustainable IRR can be defined as the r* that solves FG(.)=0.7  There is no 
close form solution to this equation, but one can see that r* will not only depend on the 
growth rate of the average covered wage (g) and the growth rate of the population of 
new borns (ϕ) – which in turn affects the growth rate of the population of contributors --, 
but also survival probabilities and retirement patterns.  To show this, Figure 1 graphs in 
the (FG, r*) space various realizations of equation (1).  Each line corresponds to a 
combination of the growth rate of the average wage, the growth rate of the population, 
retirement probabilities, and the distribution of wages.  The intersection of each line 
with the horizontal axis gives the equilibrium IRR.  We see that the IRR increases with 
the level of economic growth, the population growth rate, and the fall in retirement 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 1 for the derivation of P(b). 
7 We observe that what is required is that the contributions of current plan members are enough to finance 
all pensions assuming that reserves are invested at market prices – captured by the rate ρ.  One could 
introduce new generations into account, but this would not change the nature of the problem.  In this case 
we are looking at a sustainable cross-sectional IRR.  With new generations one would be looking at a 
longitudinal IRR.   6
probabilities by age.  We also notice that a high rate of economic growth makes the lines 
quite steep, indicating that small changes in the IRR on contributions can deviate the 
system from its long-term equilibrium.  As a corollary, for a given IRR, a small change in 
the underlying macro and demographic conditions can also divert the system from 
equilibrium.  Clearly, outside the steady state the sustainable IRR would need to change 
at each point in time.  The question is how.   
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Note: The baseline scenario is built over the following assumptions: population growth of 
1% per year; GDP growth of 3% per year; 2% growth in wages between ages; survival 
probabilities for Morocco in 2004; minimum retirement age 40 with 1% probability and 
maximum retirement age 75; no dropouts within age cohorts.  The other lines represent 
deviations in one of the parameters from the baseline. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations  
 
The proposal developed here is based on an accounting framework “a la 
Swedish” -- although as shown below the actual indexation mechanism used in Sweden 
is not fully consistent with this underlying framework.  The idea is simple:  choose the 
IRR at each time t in a way that guarantees that the liabilities of the pension system are 
equal to its assets.  The trick then is to properly define these liabilities, and in particular, 
the assets of the ER pension system with pay-as-you-go financing.   
The assessment of the liabilities of the system is straight forward.  They are given 
by the present value of future pension payments to current retirees and to current 
contributors based on rights accrued to date.8  In the case of a notional account system 
the value of the IPD is easily defined.  It is given by the capital accumulated in the 
                                                 
8 The pension system liability definition here corresponds to the “gross implicit pension debt I” definition 
of Holzmann, Palacios and Zviniene (2001).   7
individual accounts plus the pensions in payment by age cohort multiplied by the 
annuity factor for that cohort. 
The definition of assets is less intuitive.  Clearly, a portion of the assets is given 
by the ¨reserves¨ of the pension plan – which can be equal to zero.  The other part is the 
so called pay-as-you-go asset which is defined as the present value of future 
contributions minus the present value of pensions ensuing from these contributions (see 
Valdez-Prieto, 2005a; and Robalino and Bogomolova, 2005).  The pay-as-you-go asset is 
positive when the implicit rate of return on contributions paid by the ER pension plan is 
below the rate used to discount future cash-flows.  This rate can be approximated by the 
rate of return that the pension institution receives on the investments of the buffer fund 
(a market rate).  The difference between this rate and the implicit rate of return on 
contributions can be interpreted either as the “opportunity cost” of saving in the ER plan 
or, put in other terms, an implicit tax on savings.  Thus, in an ER system that is very 
generous, meaning it pays an IRR above market, the pay-as-you-go asset is negative.  
 Formally, in a solvent ER pension system with pay-as-you-go financing the 
following equality needs to hold: 
t t t F PA IPD + = ,           ( 2 )  
where IPDt is the implicit pension debt at time t; PAt the pay-as-you-go asset and Ft the 
value of the reserves (financial assets).  So in summary, in a solvent pension system, the 
pension promises that have been made to date have to be backed by financial assets and 
the future contributions net of pension rights accruing from them.  As discussed above, 
a pension plan can operate with a negative pay-as-you-go asset, but not forever.   
From equation (2) it follows that given the growth rate of the pay-as-you-go 
asset, call it a, and the growth rate of the reserves, call it r, one can solve for the 
allowable growth rate of the IPD at time t, holding constant system, economic, and 
demographic conditions.  It turns out that this allowable growth rate of the IPD is the IRR 
that the pension system can afford to pay on contributions.  It is the rate by which the 
pension plan can revalorize wages and index pensions.  Indeed, as explained before, the 
IPD is made of accumulated contributions plus pensions in payment multiplied by the 
appropriate annuity factor. So the growth rate of the IPD is given by the growth rate of 
the stock of contributions and the stock of pensions in payments.   8


















,       (3) 
Hence, if one is able to obtain an accurate and simple estimate of the PA at each point in 
time, the expected sustainable IRR can be easily computed. 
Before presenting a possible measure for the PA, we discuss how the approach 
proposed here to estimate the sustainable IRR differs from the Swedish system. 
 
The analytical framework for the Swedish automatic stabilization mechanism is 
developed in Settergren and Mikula (2005).  The authors start by dividing the cross-
section financing gap of the pension system (a simplification of equation 1) by total 
contributions.  In doing so, the authors indicate that they approximate the total 
financing gap that can be supported by one unit of contribution.  The authors call this 
ratio the turnover duration (TD) and show, under simplifying assumptions, that the TD 
is equal to the money weighted average age of retirees minus the money weighted 
average age of contributors.  The turnover duration times the contribution base then 
provides an estimate of what they call the contribution asset – different from the pay-as-
you-go asset concept discussed above.  Given information about the value of reserves, 
the authors calculate the “total assets” of the system.  When assets are equal or above 
pension liabilities, contributions/pensions are revalorized/indexed by the growth rate 
of the covered average wage.  The indexation factor for pensions is also adjusted to take 
into account the interest rate imputed in the calculation of the annuity factors (see next 
section).  When assets fall below liabilities a “balancing mechanism” is activated and the 
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9 We emphasize that this description of the Swedish NDC system does not follow from the framework 
developed in Settergren and Mikula (2005).  If one applies the framework rigorously, the rate used to 

























   9
where Wt is the average covered wage at time t.  Basically, the IRR is equal to the 
funding ratio multiplied by the growth rate of the average covered wage. If the funding 
ratio falls below one, then pensions and wages are indexed by less than the growth rate 
of the average covered wage (at least in the initial stage of “balancing”). 10    
  The same IRR is used to index pensions, but it is adjusted to take into account the 













t ,         ( 5 )    
where i is the discount rate imputed in the calculation of the annuity.11  
There are several issues with this proposed balancing mechanism.  A first issue is 
that the mechanism does not follow from first principles.  It is unclear why an equation 
such as (4) was used instead of equation (3), where PA would have been replaced by 
TD*C.  The second issue relates to the interpretation of the turnover duration.  
Mathematically, the TD is not a good approximation of the pay-as-go-asset, which is the 
relevant concept.  For instance, the TD can increase as a result of an increase in life 
expectancy and that would be perceived as an increase in contribution assets when in 
fact that increase can reduce the pay-as-you-asset as individuals receive pensions for 
longer.  It is also not clear why the TD would provide an estimate of the financing gap 
that can be supported by a given contribution base.  It could be informative regarding 
the level of the financing gap, but not necessarily whether it is sustainable.  Actually, if 
the system is solvent one would like the financing gap to be zero:  liabilities would 
equate financial assets plus the pay-as-you-go asset.  Finally, as the authors emphasize, 
the calculation of the TD is based on current information and the assumption of constant 
population growth.  The TD would not capture future changes in the contribution base 
and therefore could overestimate or underestimate assets, thus paying an IRR on 
contributions that is too high or too low.  In fact, Settergren (2001) admits that long-term 
deficits in the buffer fund can arise in the case of long-term strains on the system like 
                                                 
10 In fact, the Swedish indexation mechanism works somewhat differently allowing the indexation to be 
higher than the growth rate of the average covered wage in a “recovery stage” when the balancing 
mechanism is active. The formula above is a simplification; however, the programming of our projections 
is based on the true system rules. 
11 i=0.016 under the rules of the Swedish system.   10
negative population growth.  Section 4 will show that this is indeed what happens in the 
presence of exogenous shocks. 
  
If the TD is to be replaced, how would the PA be computed?  In the proposed 
approach, computing the PA is not very different from computing the IPD – which is 
also required in the Sweden scheme.  For the IPD, one needs estimates of G factors 
(annuity factors) by age. These depend on survival probabilities by age and assumptions 
about the future indexation of pensions (see discussion below on the discount rate used 
in the formula).  For the PA, one needs estimates of what we call Z factors -- to keep 
similar terminologies -- that give net assets for each age cohort.  These Z factors also 
depend on survival probabilities and the market discount rate, but in addition estimates 
of retirement/dropout probabilities, the current age profile of wages (also used for the 
calculation of the TD), and the expected growth rate for wages.  So computing the 
expected PA is not more difficult than computing the TD or the IPD. 
  The Z factor for a cohort of age i at time t, is given by:   
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where v(a) gives the probability of not being retired by age a, d(a) the probability of not 
having dropped out of the system by age a, and E(r*) gives the expected rate of return on 
contributions.  Basically, expression A captures the present value of contributions paid 
at age a, and expression B the pensions (and lump sum) paid to new retirees (and 
dropouts) at age a.12  Then the pay-as-you-go asset at time t is: 
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where N(a,t) are the contributors of age a at time t, dN(b,k) the new entrants of age b at 
time k, and T the planning horizon.   
One can argue that having estimates of future entrants, the growth rate of the 
average wage, and the expected rate or return on contributions is complicated.  The 
                                                 
12 See Appendix 1 for the derivation of Z(i,t).   11
proposal developed here assumes that past trends hold.  The E(r*) is estimated by an 
average of past IRRs and new contributors by age can be projected given past 
information on new entrants and their age distribution.  A virtue of the PA is that it is 
forward looking.  Basically, it tries to anticipate the effects of shocks that occur today on 
the future flows of net contributions.  Clearly, the past is not necessary a good predictor 
of the future.  Hence, when calculating the PA of a system in year 2005, one would miss 
the impact of unknown phenomena that take place, say, one decade from now.  Let us 
assume, for instance, that the unknown shock is a permanent drastic drop in coverage 
rates that takes place suddenly – unannounced.  Estimates of the PA in the years prior to 
the shock would overestimate its true value (i.e., wages and pensions would be 
revalorized/indexed by a rate that is too high).  Nonetheless, as soon as the shock takes 
place, and the system identifies that is permanent, its short and long-term effects would 
be incorporated in the calculation of the IRR, making up for previous over adjustments.  
We also emphasize that those shocks that take place far into the future have small 
impact in the current value of the PA.  
 
Computing annuities and indexing pensions13   
  There is an important precision to be made regarding the calculation of annuity 
factors and the type of indexation mechanism used for pensions.  Often decisions at 
these two levels are disconnected and, as shown in Section 4, this is problematic for an 
NA system without the appropriate stabilization mechanism. 
If in practice pensions are going to be indexed by the IRR (or rough proxies such 
as wages or GDP growth rates), which is also the rate used to revalorize wages, then the 
annuity factor should not incorporate a discount rate.  In other words, the pension 
would be simply equal to the notional capital accumulated in the individual account 
divided by the life expectancy at retirement.  On the contrary, if pensions are solely 
going to be indexed by prices, the annuity factor should incorporate in the calculation 
the expected IRR.  Basically, if pensions are only going to be indexed by prices then they 
should be higher from the start. If they are going to be indexed by the IRR then they 
                                                 
13 This is not an issue if the public pension system only manages the accumulation phase and then 
outsources the issuance of annuities.  Basically, upon retirement individuals would receive a lump sum and 
then have the mandate to purchase an annuity in the private sector. Alternatively, the pension fund could 
conduct biddings among private sector providers to allocate cohorts of annuitants.   12
should be smaller.         
  To see this it is useful to consider the case of an NA system in a steady state 
where the sustainable IRR (r*) is known and where there is no inflation.  Thus, 
contributions are revalorized by this rate and pensions can grow at this rate, meaning 
they should be discounted by this rate as well.14  Hence, if there is no indexation, the 
pension at age R, pR , solves:   































1 1 β ,      (7) 
where s(R,b) is the survival probability between ages R and b.  The pension will be given 
by the accumulated contributions (expression in brackets) divided by an annuity factor 
that does incorporate r* as the discount rate.    
If pensions are indexed, the pension at age R should solve:   
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1 1 β ,     (8) 
In this case the growth rate and the discount rate cancel out and the pension is 
computed by dividing the accumulated capital by life expectancy.   
In both cases, the r* becomes the IRR received by individuals and, as shown in 
Robalino et al. (2005), this rate does not depend on wages and contributions histories.  In 
the first case the pension is higher from the start but it is not indexed in real terms.  In 
the second case, it is lower but it is indexed.    
What happens if the annuity is computed using (8) but pensions are not indexed 
(in real terms).  In this case the pension would be too low relative to the contributions 
and therefore the implicit rate of return received by the individuals would be lower.  
Indeed, the discount rate necessary to make the present value of contributions and 
pensions flows equal would need to be lower.  On the contrary, if the annuity is 
computed using (7) and pensions are also indexed (in real terms), individuals would be 
receiving an IRR that is too high (and therefore unsustainable).  In fact, it is possible to 
define the correct indexation factor π given the sustainable IRR and the discount rate i 
used in the calculation of the pension.  Factor π needs to solve: 
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Where CR is the capital accumulated in the individual account at the time of retirement.  
The expression in brackets is the value of the initial pension calculated on the basis of a 
discount rate i.  Equation (9) states that if, ex-post, the pension is going to be indexed by 
π the present value should still be equal to CR.  It is easy to show that for equation (9) to 
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Clearly, if the IRR itself is not sustainable, then this correction will not solve the 
problem of financial sustainability.   Figure 2 graphs π as a function of i, for IRR=3%.  
Cases below the line pay to individuals implicit rates of return on contributions which 
are below the sustainable IRR.  Cases, above the line pay implicit rates of return that are 
above the sustainable IRR.     14
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Note:  The line plots simply the tradeoffs between the discount rate and the indexation 
factor required to reproduce the sustainable IRR, in this case fix at 3%. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. 
 
In practice, policy makers face these choices, but given uncertainty the answer is 
often less straightforward.  Introducing a discount factor in the calculation of the 
annuity is a way to guarantee higher pensions up front.  The discount factor, however, 
can be too high to be sustainable.   
If the system incorporates a stabilization mechanism such as equation (3), then 
there is flexibility in terms of whether or not a discount factor is used in the calculation 
of the annuity.  Indeed, the stabilization mechanism will ensure that the IRR that is used 
to revalorize wages and index pensions after the discount factor was taken into account 
brings the pension system to a sustainable path. The higher the discount rate used in the 
calculation of the annuity, the lower the IRR that the system will pay (i.e., the lower the 
rate used to revalorize and index pensions).  If no discount factor is used, then the 
system will pay the maximum IRR other things being constant. Because the IRR is the 
rate that should be used to discount the flow of contributions and pensions, this 
approach ensures that all individuals within a given age-cohort receive the same implicit 
rate of return on their contributions – albeit one that moves over time – regardless of 
wages and contributions histories. 
With no stabilization mechanism, however, the discount factor might be too high 
relative to the allowable IRR – which as seen before changes over time – and it will not   15
be possible to correct.  This is shown in Section 4.  One alternative in this case, is not to 
include a discount factor in the calculation of the annuity, but to guarantee full 
indexation of pensions on the basis of the system IRR.  In Appendix 2 we show, 
however, that under general conditions individuals – at least those who have limited 
access to financial markets and face stringent borrowing constraints - would be better off 
if a discount rate is introduced up front and the pensions are indexed by prices.    
 
3. Simulating the robustness of alternative rules for the IRR of the system 
To study the dynamics of an ER pension system with pay-as-you-go financing 
under alternative rules for the IRR, we use a simple one sector macro model that 
incorporates a notional account pension scheme (see Appendix 3 for a formal 
description).  For simplicity, and given that the focus is to analyze the dynamics of the 
IRR, economic growth and the savings rate of the economy are exogenous in the model.  
Future extensions should study the behavior of the pension system with endogenous 
savings.  The dynamics of wages and the market interest rate, on the other hand, are 
endogenous in our model.  This model provides a mechanism to ensure internal 
consistency regarding changes in pension system design, macroeconomic trends and 
demographic trends.  For instance, simulated fluctuations in GDP growth will affect the 
pension system through changes in wages and the interest rate – a recession is 
accompanied by higher interest rates.  Similarly, retirement and survival probabilities 
will affect the economy through a change in the size and age composition of the labor 
force, which in turn affects wages and the interest rate.  Coverage and labor supply, 
however, are not affected by changes in the macroeconomy or pension system 
parameters.     
We use the model to understand how various rules for the evolution of IRR on 
contributions affect the dynamics of the pension system.  In particular, cash balances 
and reserves levels.  If the earnings-related system is financially self-sustainable, then 
the value of reserves should never be negative – or at least not for an extended period of 
time.  
We consider 6 rules to determine the IRR across a large number of economic and 
demographic scenarios:  (i) wages are revalorized by the growth rate of the average   16
covered wage and pensions are indexed by prices (i.e., growth is zero in real terms);  (ii) 
the IRR is equal to the growth rate of the average covered wage and it applies to wages 
and pensions; (iii) the IRR is equal to the growth rate of the covered wage bill; (iv) the 
IRR is equal to the growth rate of GDP; (v) the IRR is based on the Swedish system 
(equation 4); and (vi) the IRR is based on the proposal developed in this paper (equation 
3).15  We also take into account two different methods to compute the annuity; with and 
without a discount factor. 
As for the scenarios, we consider combinations of eight blocks of variables: (i) 
population growth; (ii) GDP growth; (iii) retirement probabilities; (iv) drop-out/reentry 
probabilities; (v) survival probabilities; (vi) productivity by age; (vii) inflation and 
interest rates; and (viii) the coefficient of human capital in the production function.  
Basically, each of these variables/groups of variables is allowed to be in one out of three 
states.16  The various states are described in Table 1 and have been selected to put the 
pension system under high stress and assess its resilience. The deviations from state 1 
can be considered as shocks to the system.  As a general rule, they are introduced at a 
point in time when the system has already reached a great degree of maturity.   
   
                                                 
15 A paper by Lindeman et al. (2005) had analyzed the first 3 rules (with alternative combinations for wages 
and pensions), but outside a macro framework.  The analysis here confirms some of the findings. 
16 The probability of state 1 occurring is 50% for each of the blocks of variables. The probability of state 2 
or 3 occurring is 25% respectively for each of the blocks of variables.   17
Table 1:  State for Key Model Variables 




Constant population (0% 
growth of population of 
new born.) 
Population of new born 
initially remains constant, 
then decreases at an 
annual 0.5% rate between 
years 50 and 150, then it 
grows at 0.5% per year 
beyond year 150. 
Population of new born 
initially remains constant, 
then it gets on a steady 
decreasing path at an 
annual 0.5% rate beyond 
year 50. 
GDP growth  Real GDP grows at 2.5% 
per year.   
Real GDP grows at 2.5% 
per year, then increases to 
7% in year 150, then falls to 
1% in year 165. 
Real GDP grows at 2.5% 
per year, then a recession 
hits in year 150 (-5% per 
year).  The economy 




Probability is zero up to 
age 39 then it increases 
linearly from 1% at age 40 
to 100% at age 75.   
Like state 1, but 
probability of retirement at 
age 40 increases from 1% 
to 30% in year 150; for 
other ages it is adjusted 
accordingly.  
Like state 2, but the 
increase in the initial 
retirement probability 
does not happen through 
an immediate shock, but 
over a 30 year period. 
Dropout/reentry 
probabilities 
Dropout probabilities are 
zero at all ages. 
Dropout probability for all 
ages suddenly increases to 
30% in year 150 and then 
falls to 20% in year 155.  
The reentry probability is 
10%. 
Dropout probability for all 
ages suddenly increases to 
30% in year 150 and then 
fall to 20% in year 160.  




Survival probabilities are 
constant over time at levels 
observed in Morocco 
today. 
Survival probabilities 
increase to 1.5 times the 
expected 2050 levels for 
Morocco by year 150 of the 
simulation. 
Survival probabilities 
increase to twice the 
expected 2050 levels for 




Productivity increases at 
2% for each year of age. 
Productivity increases 
initially at 2% and then 
increases from 2% to 4% 
between years 100 and 110. 
Productivity increases 
initially at 4% and drops 
from 4% to 1% between 
years 100 and 110. 
Inflation and 
interest rates 
Inflation at 2%.  Real rate 
of return on reserves equal 
to 30% of marginal 
productivity of capital. 
Discount rate and rate 
used to compute annuity 
set equal to long term GDP 
growth rate.  Marginal 
return on capital equal to 
1.25 times GDP growth. 
Inflation at 2%.  Real rate 
of return on reserves equal 
to 60% of marginal 
productivity of capital. 
Discount rate and rate 
used to compute annuity 
set equal to long term GDP 
growth rate.  Marginal 
return on capital equal to 
1.25 times GDP growth. 
Inflation at 2%.  Real rate 
of return on reserves equal 
to 60% of marginal 
productivity of capital. 
Discount rate and rate 
used to compute annuity 
set equal to long term GDP 
growth rate.  Marginal 
return on capital equal to 2 
times GDP growth. 
Coefficient of 
human capital  
Coefficient of human 
capital equal to 0.5. 
Coefficient of human 
capital equal to 0.1. 
Coefficient of human 
capital equal to 0.8. 
Initial population of new born is 1,000.  Initial GDP per capita is 100 units.  Initial level of capital is calibrated to achieve 
targeted, long term, marginal return on capital.  Minimum age to enter the labor force (f) set at 20 years 
 
We discuss the results of the simulations in three parts.  First, we look at the 
dynamics of funds reserves under each of the rules for the IRR across a random sample 
of 100 scenarios evolving over a period of 300 years.  Then, for each of the indexation   18
rules, we look at the distribution of the following outputs: (i) the value of the reserves as 
a share of GDP in year 150 and year 300; (ii) the value of the cash-balance as a share of 
GDP in year 150 and in year 300; (iii) the average IRR for the period t∈ [150,300]; and 
(iv) the maximum value of the reserves as a share of GDP during the entire simulation 
period.  Finally, we analyze the sensitivity of the steady level of fund reserves and the 
IRR to changes in selected model variables.   
We first discuss the simulations where the calculation of the annuity factor does 
not include a discount rate.   The results show that only the new proposal developed in 
this paper and the “price indexation mechanism”  -- that is salaries (contributions) 
revalorized by the growth rate of the covered average wage and pensions indexed by 
inflation -- are capable of avoiding extended periods of negative reserves (see Figure 3).  
Like the other revalorization/indexation mechanisms, however, price indexation is not 
stable in the sense that for some of the scenarios assets (reserves) accumulate without 
bound.  This implies that the system is penalizing workers by paying an IRR below the 
sustainable level, essentially, a higher implicit tax on savings than what the system the 
system requires.   
This being said, none of the indexation mechanisms are systematically 
unsustainable when the annuity is calculated without discounting, simply because there 
is “more room”  in this case to index pensions.  The average value of reserves over the 
100 random combinations of states is positive for all the 6 indexation mechanisms both 
at year 150 and 300. The mean cash balance is positive for all the indexation mechanisms 
at year 300, and positive or slightly negative at year 150 when some of the shocks take 
effect (see Table 2). 
The Swedish mechanism clearly outperforms the average wage growth, the 
covered wage bill growth and the GDP growth indexation mechanisms in terms of 
keeping positive system’s reserves.  However, the Swedish system exhibits a tendency to 
over accumulate assets in case of positive population growth and the balancing 
mechanism is vulnerable against a shrinking population as well. (See the Appendix 4 for 
a comprehensive comparative sensitivity analysis of the Swedish system and the new 
proposal including various population growth scenarios.).  Indeed, several combinations   19
of states that include long-term negative population growth put the Swedish system 
onto an unsustainable path. 
As pointed out already, the inflation adjustment rule does not show weakness 
towards system sustainability, as pensions are indexed, on average, by an IRR below the 
sustainable level.  In fact, price indexation displays a high variance in the level of 
reserves.  The protection against “system bankruptcy” therefore comes at the cost of 
high implicit taxes on savings. 
The proposal developed in this paper is the only mechanism that avoids 
extended periods with negative reserves and converges towards a sustainable steady-
state in all the scenarios.      
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Figure 3:  Dynamics of the Reserves/GDP Ratio When Annuity Does Not Include a Discount Rate 
            Prices                      Covered average wage 
    
  Covered wage bill                     GDP 
    
  Swedish system                             Equation (3) 
 
Source:  Author’s calculation. 
 
When a discount rate is introduced in the calculations of the annuity the results 
are very different (see Figure 4).17  The average wage growth, the covered wage bill 
growth and the GDP growth indexation mechanisms become unsustainable in all the 
scenarios. This is not very surprising because the inclusion of the discount rate in the 
calculation of the annuity factor results in higher initial values for pensions, and these 
higher initial pensions are adjusted through identical proportional increases as in the 
case of no discount factor in the annuity calculation.  In the case of average wage, wage 
                                                 
17 The discount rate that we use is equal, as is the standard assumption, to the long-term growth rate of 
GDP.     21
bill, and GDP indexation pensions are essentially indexed twice.  First, ex-ante, at the 
time of calculating the pension – since the annuity factor already incorporates a discount 
(i.e., indexation) factor – then each time pensions are paid.  Price indexation behaves 
better since, as discussed in the previous section, the calculation of the annuity with a 
discount factor (expressed in real terms), is a consistent with price indexation.  The 
problem is that the discount rate used in the calculation of the annuity factor is not 
necessarily the sustainable rate.  Price indexation therefore struggles with the higher 
level of initial pensions without any mechanism for correction. 
     Only the Swedish indexation mechanism and the new proposal based on 
equation (3) are equipped to adjust to this difference in the use of the discount factor in 
the calculation of the annuity.  The Swedish mechanism, when the balancing mechanism 
is not activated, behaves like price indexation if the growth rate of the average wage is 
equal to the discount rate used in the calculation of the annuity factor.  The stabilization 
mechanism, however, is not sufficient to deal with periods of negative population 
growth rate and therefore there are still scenarios where the reserves of the system 
become negative 
  The rule proposed in this paper, on the other hand, never generate negative 
reserves levels and converge in all cases to a stable steady state. In part this is because 
the proposed algorithm also takes into account the impact of the discount rate in the 
pay-as-you-go asset (i.e., other things being equal, the higher the discount rate the lower 
the pay-as-you-go asset). 
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  Figure 4:  Evolution of the Reserves/GDP Ratio when the Annuity Includes a Discount Rate 
              Prices          Covered average wage 
 
   Covered wage bill                      GDP 
 
      Swedish system                Equation (3) 
 
The discount rate used in the calculation of the annuity is equal to the long-term growth rate of the economy. 
Source:  Author’s calculations. ` 
 
To gain more insights into the results of the simulations, we look at summary 
statistics for key output variables (see Table 2).   There are several interesting 
observations.  First, the mechanism proposed in this paper and the price indexation 
mechanisms are the only ones capable of insuring positive reserves level at the end of 
the simulation horizon.  Even the Swedish system would run into debt by year 300  in 
the amount of 57.2% of  GDP under the worst set of  “environment conditions.”   We 
also observe that both the range and the variance of level of reserves are the smallest 
under the indexation rule following equation (3). The proposed mechanism is capable to 
“downward adjust” the IRR in straining situations, but even these straining set of   23
circumstances did not push the IRR into the negative. It is an important message of the 
simulation because, conceptually, negative IRR paths could be consistent with equation 
(3) under certain circumstances.  These, however, would be difficult to implement at the 
practical level. 
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Selected Outputs 
   Annuity calculated with discounting  Annuity calculated without discounting 
   Mean  Stdev  Min   Max  Mean  Stdev  Min   Max 
Average wage                 
Reserves/GDP t=150  -1.326 0.698  -2.480  -0.146  0.918  1.283  -0.050  4.341 
Reserves/GDP t=300  -3.390  3.514  -17.241 -0.728 0.761 2.331 -1.301 8.856 
Balance/GDP t=150  -0.031 0.013  -0.046  -0.009  -0.002  0.006  -0.008  0.004 
Balance/GDP t=300  -0.022 0.017  -0.065  0.001  0.000  0.006  -0.012  0.013 
Average IRR (to year 300)  0.021 0.005  0.009  0.032  0.021  0.005  0.009  0.032 
Wage bill                   
Reserves/GDP t=150  -0.959  0.561 -1.689  -0.124 1.180 1.400 0.277  4.823 
Reserves/GDP t=300  -2.765  3.036  -15.027 -0.366 1.207 2.644 -0.557 9.164 
Balance/GDP t=150  -0.023  0.010 -0.030  -0.009 0.004 0.000 0.003  0.004 
Balance/GDP t=300  -0.020  0.013 -0.044  -0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001  0.004 
Average IRR (to year 300)  0.025 0.006  0.016  0.038  0.025  0.006  0.016  0.038 
GDP                   
Reserves/GDP t=150  -0.959  0.561 -1.689  -0.124 1.180 1.400 0.277  4.823 
Reserves/GDP t=300  -3.255  3.150  -15.027 -0.794 0.850 2.535 -1.993 9.164 
Balance/GDP t=150  -0.023  0.010 -0.030  -0.009 0.004 0.000 0.003  0.004 
Balance/GDP t=300  -0.020  0.013 -0.044  -0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001  0.004 
Average IRR (to year 300)  0.022 0.004  0.016  0.025  0.022  0.004  0.016  0.025 
Inflation                   
Reserves/GDP t=150  1.191 1.142  0.297  4.058  2.706  2.113  1.146  8.115 
Reserves/GDP t=300  0.928  2.102 -0.691  8.262  3.734 5.657 0.509 19.952 
Balance/GDP t=150  0.005  0.009 -0.007  0.020  0.024 0.003 0.019  0.028 
Balance/GDP t=300  0.001  0.002 -0.003  0.008  0.016 0.009 0.004  0.033 
Average IRR (to year 300)  0.021 0.005  0.009  0.032  0.021  0.005  0.009  0.032 
Swedish mechanism                   
Reserves/GDP t=150  0.859 1.187  -0.040  4.028  0.928  1.295 -0.046  4.381 
Reserves/GDP t=300  0.947 2.136  -0.471  8.270  0.968  2.254 -0.517  8.930 
Balance/GDP t=150  -0.001 0.005  -0.007  0.004  -0.002  0.006  -0.008  0.004 
Balance/GDP t=300  0.002 0.004  -0.009  0.012  0.002  0.005 -0.011  0.013 
Average IRR (to year 300)  0.019 0.006  0.002  0.030  0.019  0.006  0.002  0.030 
Equation 3                   
Reserves/GDP t=150  1.381 0.196  1.057  1.841  1.548  0.280  1.102  2.176 
Reserves/GDP t=300  1.057 0.460  0.498  1.851  1.203  0.533  0.572  2.266 
Balance/GDP t=150  0.019 0.012  -0.007  0.036  0.021  0.012 -0.009  0.037 
Balance/GDP t=300  0.008 0.008  -0.008  0.021  0.008  0.009 -0.009  0.025 
Average IRR (to year 300)  0.002  0.006 -0.007 0.0164 0.014 0.007 0.003 0.0305 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
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To better understand the interactions between the macroeconomy and the 
pension system under the Swedish and the proposed indexation mechanisms we 
simulated the effects of isolated changes in selected model variables on the steady-state 
levels of the fund reserves, cash balances, the path of the funding ratio and the IRR.  The 
results are presented in Appendix 4.  The main messages from the analysis can be 
summarized are follows. 
First, it is interesting to observe that the Swedish system generates higher 
funding ratios than the proposal developed in this paper.  This reflects the difference in 
the methodology used to calculate the pay-as-you-go asset.  The new proposal 
implements a direct estimation of this asset.  The Swedish system approximates this 
asset through the level of contributions and the turnover duration.  The results suggest 
that this methodology tends to overestimate the pay-as-you-go asset. 
Second, the new proposal generates more rapid adjustment paths in response to 
shocks.  Fluctuations in adjustment paths are also less pronounced than in the case of the 
Swedish system.  This is because the Swedish system is sensitive to changes in the 
growth rate of the covered average wage, which is in turn is very sensitive to economic 
shocks.  The new proposal relies on the pay-as-you-go asset which dampens these 
fluctuations by also taking into account the effects on the dynamics of the population of 
contributors and beneficiaries. 
Third, the Swedish system is very sensitive to changes in the growth rate of the 
population growth rate and there are cases where the system is not able  to avoid 
negative reserve values.  This can also be explained, in part, by a revalorization based on 
the growth rate of the covered average wage, which will be higher when population 
growth rates – and therefore the growth rate of the labor force – fall. 
Finally, while the funding ratio falls when retirement probabilities, drop-out 
probabilities, and survival probabilities increase, the reduction is not always sufficient to 
activate the balancing mechanism.  This implies that revalorization continues to depend 
on the growth rate of the covered average wage, while pensions are indexed by the 
growth rate of the average wage adjusted by the discount rate included in the annuity 
factor. When retirement probabilities increase, wages and the IRR go up. When survival 
probabilities increase, wages and the IRR go down.  Only when the shock is driven by   25
an increase in drop-out probabilities, which is less important for the dynamics of wages, 
at least in the short term, the IRR is more responsive to the funding level. 
 By looking at the IRRs generated by the Swedish system one can see that these 
are often above the IRRs generated by the new proposal, which as shown in the previous 
section, preserve the solvency of the system (i.e., liabilities are equal to assets). 
  
 
The dynamics of the pension plan under the Swedish stabilization mechanism 
deserves further analysis.  As previously discussed, the IRR paid by the system is 
roughly equal to the funding ratio times the growth rate of the average wage – when the 
balancing mechanism is on.  The funding ratio in turn depends on the turnover duration 
that, when multiplied by total contributions, is supposed to provide an estimate of the 
assets of the plan – excluding the reserves.  Because the turnover duration depends on 
average contributions and average pensions by age, it is sensitive to changes in 
retirement and dropout probabilities.  It is also sensitive to changes in the age-wage 
profile and shocks that affect the marginal productivity of labor.  Figure 5 displays the 
evolution of the turnover duration across the same 100 scenarios presented above.  We 
observe that for several of the scenarios, those where macroeconomic, behavioral, 
and/or demographic shocks are observed, the TD is subject to important changes.    
These fluctuations, however, are often positive indicating a higher level of assets.  
Therefore, for several of the shocks assets would actually increase and the balancing 
mechanism would not be activated.   
 
Figure 5:  Dynamics of the Turnover Duration in the Swedish Stabilization System 
        Annuity with discount factor           Annuity without discount factor 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.   26
4.  Introducing Government Indexed Bonds 
 
The proposal to invest the contributions of the pension plan into government 
bonds to ensure financial sustainability and make pension liabilities explicit was, to our 
knowledge, first introduced by Buchanan (1968).  Other theoretical discussions include 
(Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987; Sinn, 2000).  There have also been proposals for 
applications of the concept (see Palacios and Sin, 2002) and Robalino et al. (2005a, 
2005b), but the mechanics and fiscal implications have not been fully spelled out. 
The idea is that, under the certainty case, a well designed ER system can be made 
financially self-sustainable if past wages (or contributions) and pensions are 
revalorized/indexed by the rate of return on the government bonds.  Indeed, in this 
case, the value of the bonds held by the pension system is equal, at all points in time, to 
the pension liabilities.18  In addition, government bonds can serve other purposes: (i) 
improve fiscal management and provide incentives for a more careful choice of the 
parameters of the pension system -- since the liability is now explicit; (ii) facilitate the 
transparent financing of the IPD of a pre-existing system; and (iii) reduce the risk of 
capital loss if workers savings are managed by a public institution where governance, 
accountability and investment policies are week.  If at some point in time the 
government bonds become tradable, then this policy can also facilitate the transition to a 
defined-contribution fully-funded pension system.    
There are two problems with the original idea however.  First, when there is 
uncertainty regarding the evolution of demographic parameters, pension liabilities can 
increase – for instance due to an unexpected increase in life expectancies – while the 
value of the bonds remains constant.  This would generate a liability within the pension 
system that is not “funded.”  This miss-match would need to be corrected by adjusting 
pensions (retirees face the burden), by introducing a temporary contribution that does 
not accrue pension rights (a tax on labor), and/or general revenues (tax payers face the 
cost).   
A second problem is that, as shown in Section 2, the sustainable IRR that the ER 
system can afford to pay on contributions (and can use to index pensions) could be 
                                                 
18  The same caveat regarding the discount factor used in the calculation of the IPD and the indexation 
policy which were discussed above apply.     27
above the growth rate of return on the bond, which is presumably below the rate of 
return of the market portfolio.  This is because of the presence of the pay-as-you-go 
asset.  By paying a rate of return below the sustainable rate, the share of bonds in GDP 
could increase too fast and plan members would be penalized.       
The implication is that even if contributions are allocated to government bonds, 
it is desirable that the IRR of the system be calculated on the basis of equation (3) above. 
  
 In the remainder of this section we discuss how the proposed system could be 
designed, what are the considerations to keep in mind, and what would be the fiscal 
implications.  In particular, we address the following questions:  (i) what types of 
government bonds could be used; (ii) how the ratio of bonds to GDP would evolve; (iii) 
how bonds should be issued/repaid and what would be the proper accounting within 
the fund; and (iv) what would happen if the bonds are traded.  
 
Types of bonds  
In principle, any type of government bond could be used to invest the 
contributions of the ER system.  The choice is both important from a fiscal point of view 
and from the perspective of the pension fund.  For the latter, since different bonds have 
different yields, choices affect the IRR that the system pays and thus replacement rates 
for a given level of the contribution rate.  We argue, however, that fiscal considerations 
should dominate in this case.  First, because if the financial arrangement is not fiscally 
sustainable, then the pension system would not be either.  Second, because investments 
in any type of bond are a premium relative to the pure pay-as-you-go system – where 
individuals are expected to earn only the rate of return on the pay-as-you-go asset. 
Given the desire to keep the size of the government liability manageable in 
relation to government revenues – which are used to serve this liability – one natural 
alternative to consider is the issuance of GDP indexed government bonds.19  As 
                                                 
19 Tax revenues indexed government bonds could be a variation, but one that could be very difficult to 
implement. Another alternative is a government bond with a coupon rate that would be identical to the 
sustainable internal rate of return of the pension system.  Further research is needed to assess 
implementation issues, including impacts on government finances as a result of economic and-or 
demographic shocks.  We conjecture, however, that IRR indexed bonds would behave similarly to GDP-
indexed bonds.  The bond would be an interesting construct because, if traded, the market yield on the bond 
and the risk premium on other government obligations jointly would provide sufficient information to   28
discussed in Borensztein and Mauro (2004) these bonds can protect the government 
against increases in interest rates that would raise debt/GDP ratios – in exchange for a 
relative small premium.  Clearly, there are questions as to whether governments would 
have incentives to underreport GDP, or whether investors would be interested in the 
new financial instrument.  Through the pension funds, however, plan members become 
a powerful constituency to motivate appropriate reporting.  Moreover, by opening the 
market for this type of bond the pension fund could generate demonstration effects, 
creating demand for the instrument if it becomes tradable (see Borensztein and Mauro, 
2004 for a discussion).  
  
Implementation and accounting  
 How would bonds be issued and priced, and how would the pension fund 
manage the accounts?  The idea is that every 6 or 12 months, the cash-surplus of the 
pension fund would be invested in GDP indexed government bonds (in the transition 
period cash balances could take the form of bank deposits). These bonds are similar to 
“plain vanilla” bonds except that the coupon rate is variable.  It varies as a function of 
the growth rate of the economy.  In the general form, the coupon rate would be defined 
by: 
) ( g g r r t t − + Ω + = α ,         ( 7 )  
where rt  is the interest rate applied to pay the coupon of the bond at some time t after 
the issuance of the bond,  t r  is the coupon rate paid on pure vanilla bonds of identical 
maturity at the time of the issuance of the GDP-indexed bond, Ω is a premium that 
invertors could demand given more variance in the bond, α is the parameter of 
indexation, g is the GDP growth rate at time t and  g is the GDP growth rate expected at 
the time of issuance.   So the value of the coupon is calculated each year on the basis of 
the expected and observed growth rate of the economy. 
By design pension liabilities are always backed by government bonds.  This 
would imply that pensions are covered out of revenues from the bonds and that all new 
                                                                                                                                                 
determine whether the set of projections and probability distributions used in the calculation of the IRR is 
appropriate in the eyes of the market.  In a way, the IRR indexed government bond could be a feasible way 
of using market forces to determine the expected IRR based on all the currently available information along 
the lines of Covered Wage Bill Bonds as discussed in Valdez-Prieto (2005a) and (2005b).    29
contributions are invested in new bonds.  In practice, of course, this does not have to be 
the case.  The pension fund would invest in government bonds its operating balance 
(including revenues from coupon payments and bonds that mature).  When the 
revenues from bonds that mature exceed pension payments – this can happen as the 
maturity rates of the bonds are not necessarily aligned with retirement patterns (are 
shorter in this case) -- the surplus is reinvested in new government bonds.  On the other 
hand, if pension payments are above the value of bonds that mature – meaning that 
maturities were too long for retirement patterns, contributions can cover the difference.  
From the point of view of the pension fund, this operation is equivalent to having sold 
part of the bonds to cover the gap, while buying the equivalent amount of new bonds 
with the new contributions. 
The accounting of the proposed system is simple.  On the asset side of the 
balance sheet the pension fund keeps track of the pay-as-you-go asset and the stock of 
bonds – initially registered at face value since they are not traded.  This stock moves as a 
function of the repayments and the balance of the fund.  On the liability side of the 
balance sheet, the pension fund tracks separately the notional individual accounts 
(remunerated on the basis of equation 3) and the mathematical reserves for pensions in 
payment (indexed on the basis of equation 3).   
 When individuals retire the notional capital accumulated in their individual 
account is transferred to the mathematical reserves.  Alternatively, if the system 
outsources the issuance of annuities, the lump sum capital would be transferred to the 
selected insurance company and subtracted from the IPD.     
 
Fiscal sustainability 
How would the bonds/GDP ratio20 evolve over time?  The evolution of this ratio 
will depend on the growth rate of GDP, which affects the growth of the stock of bonds, 
as well as new issuances.  New issuance will take place as long as contributions are 
higher than pensions.  To see this, it is useful to write the cash flows that the government 
will require annually for serving bonds obligations.  It is given by: 
[ ] t t t t t t t P B C B F − + − = − − − − 1 1 1 1 ε ε        (8) 
                                                 
20 We refer to the sum of the face value of the bonds divided by total GDP.    30
where Bt-1 is the stock of bonds at year t-1, εt-1 the share of bonds that mature, Ct are total 
contributions at time t, and Pt  are total pensions.  The expression in brackets gives the 
net balance of the pension fund.  We see that when contributions are higher than 
pensions, the government is not only rolling over payments, but also issuing new bonds.  
When contributions equal pensions, the government can just roll the bonds over.  When 
contributions are below pensions, it is time for the government to start financing part of 
the bonds out of general revenues.  This is important to emphasize.  Bonds have to be 
repaid out of general revenues; the pay-as-you-go asset goes to the plan members, not to the 
government. 
As such, the analysis of sustainability of GDP indexed government bonds linked 
to the pension system is no different from the analysis of sustainability of other forms of 
public debt.  The only change is that the analysis needs to take into account the future 
cash-balance of the pension fund, which allows the government to roll-over the bonds.     
So where to stop?  When the new ER system replaces an ER system that had a 
large IPD and the government is cash-trapped, choices would be limited.  New 
issuances of GDP indexed government bonds would be used to pay the pensions of the 
old-system, in effect making its implicit debt explicit.  Above and beyond that level, 
however, the government does have several options. 
  One option is to allocate revenues from bond issuances to the repayment of 
other debt (with higher yields) or investments in liquid financial assets.   
  Another option, not mutually exclusive, is to reduce the level of borrowing by 
allowing the pension fund to diversify investments.  Basically, part of the reserves 
would be allocated to a diversified portfolio of financial assets.  This option can go hand 
in hand with the tradability of the government bonds.  Clearly, before implementation 
the appropriate governance structure would need to be in place to ensure that funds are 
managed in the best interest of plan members. 
In any event, rating agencies would need to monitor the public debt and penalize 
governments where GDP indexed bonds linked to the pension system start to 
accumulate well beyond the level of implicit debt of the old-system, without reductions 
in other sources of government debt.  The idea is for the new instrument to be an 
alternative source of financing rather than an additional source of financing.   31
To illustrate the potential fiscal impact of linking the contributions of an ER 
system to government indexed bonds, we simulate the net balance of the pension fund --
 which as shown above is equivalent to the amount of general revenues necessary to 
repay bonds at a given point in time -- under another set of economic and demographic 
scenarios.  Since in our model GDP growth is exogenous and not subject to stochastic 
shocks, we use a simple type of bonds where r=0, Ω=0, α=1, and g =r.  So, the coupon 
rate is exactly equal to GDP growth.  We implement the simulations in the case of two 
designs:  (i) the IRR takes into account the pay-as-you-go asset (equation 3); (ii) the IRR 
does not take into account the pay-as-you-go asset (simple indexation by GDP growth).  
The results are presented in Figure 6.  
A first observation is that the system with stabilization mechanism generates 
lower deficits and lower, but always positive, steady state bonds to GDP ratios – which 
is presumably good to control the accumulation of government debt.  In essence, the 
government would have less room for borrowing. 
The second observation is that all systems can generate negative cash-balances.  
The size of the short-fall between contributions and benefits depends on the nature of 
the underlying shocks.  In most cases, the short-falls should be covered by the value of 
the coupons and the bonds that mature.  In some cases, as a result of a large unexpected 
shock, short falls can be large.  In the scenarios that we have considered, which as said 
before, set very high standards for the pension fund, the deficit in the case of the system 
with a stabilization mechanism could be as large as 7% to 8% of GDP.  Clearly, dealing 
with large shocks is a challenge for any pension system.  In this case there are also 
various ways to proceed.  One is for the pension fund to request advance payment of 
part of the stock of bonds.  If the government faces liquidity constraints and/or was 
affected by the same shock that hit the pension fund, it could borrow without changing 
the fiscal stance -- it would replace one type of debt by another.  The other possibility is 
for the pension fund to trade government bonds.  This option of course has implications 
for the value of the bonds and deserves a separate discussion.   
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Figure 6:  Fiscal Impact of GDP Indexed Bonds With and Without Stabilization Mechanism 
Pure GDP Indexation 
 
GDP Indexation Plus Stabilization Mechanism 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
What happens when the GDP bonds owned by the pension fund are traded?  In 
the unlikely case that the yield demanded by investors was exactly equal to the coupon 
rate, nothing would happen.  The market price of the bonds would be equal to the face 
value of the bonds.  In reality things are different.  Investors will hold GDP indexed 
government bonds as long as these generate a premium that is “worth” the risk; not only 
the risk embedded in the variable coupon (which depends on GDP growth), but also the 
country risk,  the risk of default by the government, and the liquidity risk that 
accompanies a market that has not yet developed.  Country risk and risk of default are 
already captured by standard government bonds.  The question is what the extra 
premium to accept the extra risk is.  Under certain assumptions regarding the behavior 
of investors, this premium would be a function of the expected rate of return on a risk 
free asset, the expected growth rate of GDP, and the covariance of this growth rate with 
the “market portfolio.”  Bottom line, the higher the country risk, the higher the 
perceived probability of default, the lower the expected growth rate of the economy, and 
the higher the covariance between the growth rate of GDP and the market portfolio, the   33
higher the premium requested from investors (the higher Ω).  The higher the premium, 
the lower the price they are willing to pay for the government bonds.  Hence, it can be 
the case that when the pension system trades the government bonds it also abruptly 
loses the value of the assets.  This is particularly true at times of crisis, but it can happen 
in normal times as well, simply because when the government issues the bonds it is not 
paying the risk premium that markets would have demanded (Ω=0).  One possibility to 
solve this problem is to trade a portion of the bonds from the beginning or, even better, 
to have a parallel issuance from the start.  In this way the pension fund will also have a 
benchmark to price the bonds.    
 
5. Discussions and Policy Implications 
In this paper we have proposed a mechanism to design a financially sustainable 
and secure earnings related scheme with pay-as-you-go financing.  The mechanism 
combines the investment of reserves in GDP indexed government bonds with a new 
measure for the rate that the plan should use to revalorize contributions and index 
pensions (i.e., the sustainable implicit rate of return on contributions).  This rate is a 
function of the growth rate of the reserves (in this case the stock of government bonds) 
and the so called pay-as-you-go asset of the system. 
We argue that the proposed approach has several virtues:  (i) it eliminates the 
risk of mismanagement of the funds that inevitably accumulate during the first couple of 
decades, and which are necessary to finance pensions when the system matures; (ii) it 
improves fiscal management by making the implicit liabilities of the new system 
explicit; (iii) it provides incentives and controls for policymakers to respect rules that 
ensure the long-term financial sustainability of the ER system; (iv) it facilitates the 
transition to the “new” system in countries where the “old” ER system has accumulated 
a large IPD; and (v) facilitates the transition to a defined-contribution funded scheme. 
While the proposed arrangements could serve any ER system, they are better 
suited for notional account systems that establish a clear link between contributions, the 
rate of return on these contributions, and pensions.  In addition, this system has a simple 
characterization of the IPD:  the sum of notional capital in the individual accounts, plus 
pensions in payment by age cohort times the annuity factor of that cohort.   34
There are, however, issues that could affect implementation and that deserve 
further attention.  A first set of issues has to do with the mechanism used to compute the 
IRR on contributions.  One is that the value of the pay-as-you-go asset will depend on 
expectations about the initial IRR and the growth rate of wages – this could give room to 
discretion.  The second is that financial sustainability requires that in some 
circumstances the IRR be negative.  Since this rate is used to index pensions the 
approach would require that individuals accept the possibility of having their pensions 
drop in absolute terms.  This is unlikely to be appealing to individuals.  One way around 
this is to have pension which are only indexed by inflation but that in the calculation 
include an implicit interest rate.  The stabilization mechanism suggested here would 
then ensure that the IRR paid on contributions is properly adjusted. 
Another question is the level of sophistication of the scheme.  Some might 
consider that the proposed method to compute the IRR is complex and that pensions 
systems in middle and low income countries will not have the institutional capacity to 
implement.  Our position is that creating this institutional capacity should be part of any 
reform program -- including one that intends to keep defined benefit provisions intact.  
In all cases, information and administrative systems should be upgraded to ensure that 
the pension fund can properly track the contributions of plan members and other 
individual characteristics.  In all cases the managers of the pension plan should have 
access to up to date financial information including the evaluation of the liabilities of the 
plan.   
A third set of issues has to do with fiscal implications.  In the paper we argue 
that the fact that the government mandates a pension scheme that is not fully funded 
automatically creates an implicit liability.  The proposed arrangement does not change 
the nature of that liability – it simply makes it explicit.  Furthermore, because the bonds 
are a debt of the government with a public institution they cancel out in the reporting of 
the consolidated public debt.21  This being said, the analysis of sustainability of the 
public debt should take into account the accumulation of GDP indexed bonds with the 
pension fund.  This is simply because, as shown in the paper, the sustainability of the 
pension plan does depend on the ability of the government to serve the bonds.  So, the 
                                                 
21 This is in fact problematic since in this case the liability of the pension fund with plan members should 
be considered part of the consolidated public debt.   35
existence of these bonds imposes constraints on the use of other forms of financing.  
Because the bonds are linked to GDP and at least initially do not require a premium, 
they actually could be a very interesting source of financing for the public sector.  Still, 
there are several questions that require further analysis.  For instance, how would the 
existence of the bonds change the structure of the public debt and the spreads on other 
bonds?  How does the cost of the indexed bonds compare to other debt instruments?  
Will the government be able to meet the demand for bonds?  How will investors react to 
the accumulation of GDP indexed bonds? When should the bonds be allowed to be 
traded?  These are important questions that fall outside the scope of the paper and that 
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Appendix 1 
 
Derivation of P(b) the average pension of all individuals in a cohort retired by age b 
 
The average virtual capital accumulated by an individual of a cohort a at time t who 
retires at age i with i ≤ b: 
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β                   ( A 1 - 1 )  
If we turn this virtual pension capital into an annuity, the average pension payment of 
an individual of cohort a retiring at age i with i  ≤ b in the period when the individual 
reaches age b (i.e. at time t+b-i) is as follows: 
() () () () () () () i b r
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Recall that R(b) is the share of the age cohort (any age cohort given constant retirement 
probabilities) that retired by age b.  Consequently  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) b R i R i R 1 − −  is the share of R(b)  
that is associated with those who retired between ages i-1 and age i. Consequently the 
formula for the average pension payment at time t, calculated in relation to all 
individuals in age cohort a who retire at or before age b, can be constructed by 
integrating the previous formula over all retirement ages between a and b and including 
relative weights of the population retired between ages i and i-1: 
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Derivation of Z(i,t), the Z factor 
 
The present value of future contributions assuming that that age profile of wages 
function w(.) is consistent with the average growth rate of the covered wage bill g on the 
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The joint probability that an active person of age a either retires or drops out by age a+1 
is [] [] ) ( ) 1 ( 1 ) ( ) 1 ( 1 a d a d a v a v + − + + − . Assuming that the virtual pension capital to be 
accumulated beyond age i is to be used to purchase an annuity at retirement/drop-out 
age a, the present value of pension benefits to be earned through future contributions by 
age cohort i is as follows: 
() ()()()
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β .   (A1-5) 
Based on (A1-4) and (A1-5) and applying the sum of geometric series formula we have 
that 
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Appendix 2 
 
Welfare implications of the indexation mechanism of pensions  
 
What are the welfare implications of offering a pension that is constant in real terms 
(annuity includes the IRR in the calculation) or a pension that can grow in real terms 
(IRR is not included in the calculation of the annuity).   The answer depends on what we 
believe about the preferences, the “patience” and the rationality of participants of the 
pension scheme. For the purposes of this analysis we make the standard assumptions 
that the preferences of agents can be represented by a concave utility function over 
consumption and that the economy is in a long-term equilibrium (including 
demographic considerations) such that the growth rate of the economy, the return on 
risk-free assets and the IRR of the pension system are identical (r) and constant.22 Under 
these assumptions the cash-flow structure of the NA pension system is irrelevant if 
agents can borrow and lend at a rate r.  The interesting question emerges when this is 
not the case (i.e., they do not lend or borrow, but consume in the amount of their 
(pension) income every period). This is clearly not an assumption that holds in general, 
but extreme borrowing constraints imposed on low-income workers and the hiatus of a 
truly low-risk saving instrument for risk-averse agents may be features of reality, 
especially in low-income countries.  For simplicity we also assume that all the wealth of 
the individual at the time of retirement is in the mandatory pension fund.  
 
For the sake of simplicity we assume that individuals retire at age R and live until age 
R+T, i.e. at the moment of retirement they have T time units left of their life. The 
following equation determines the constant real value pension amount  F p  of an 
individual who had accumulated pension wealth PW by retirement age R: 
r
e
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22 The latter assumption is not crucial for the analysis, however, it allows us to disregard those outcomes of 
the model that are driven by the differences among the IRR of the pension system, the discount rate and the 
real return on the risk-free asset.   40
For the initial real pension amount  F p ˆ  that the same individual received under the 
pension cash-flow structure that provides for a growth of the real pension at rate r the 
following equation would hold: 
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Claim: In a notional account pension system, under the model assumptions of Appendix 2, the 
pension cash-flow structure with constant real value pension payments provides strictly higher 
welfare for myopic agents than a financially neutral alternative cash-flow structure with constant 




The agent with no access to financial markets enjoys the same earnings flow and 
consequent utility of full consumption of her/his earning during the active life period 
under both pension benefit calculation scenarios so the assessment of welfare 
implications can be limited to the consumption patterns beyond retirement. 
 
The discounted total utility of the agent (restricted to the retired period) under the 
constant real value pension cash-flow structure is as follows when preferences are 
represented by utility functions u(.) with u’(.)>0 and u”(.)<0 : 
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The discounted total utility of the agent under the pension cash-flow with real growth of 
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Consequently and by repeated application of the concavity of u(.) we have 






































; however, this is condition is easily satisfied since it means nothing 
else, but that  F F p p < ˆ  , which holds in accordance with (A2-3). 
 
This completes the proof.   42
Appendix 3 
 
 The Macro Model 
 
The formal description of the model is presented in Box A3-1.  The various equations are 
organized in five blocks:  population; labor force; output, wages and interest rates; plan 
members; and revenues and expenditures of the pension system.  We briefly discuss 
each of these blocks. 
 The first two equations define the dynamics of the population (N).  Basically, the 
population of new born is assumed to grow at an exogenously defined rate (λ).  Given 
survival probabilities by age, the total number of individuals in each age cohort is 
computed at each point in time. 
  Equations (A3-3) and (A3-4) determine the evolution of the labor force (L) and 
human capital (H) respectively.  The labor force is made of all individual of age a≥f 
(where f is the minimum age to be considered economically active) and who have not 
retired.  Thus, in equation (A3-3), v(a) is the probability of not being retired by age a.   
The implicit assumption is that participation rates are 100% for all ages.  This 
simplification does not affect the results from the analysis.  As for human capital, it is 
defined as the sum of the labor force by age-cohort multiplied by their 
productivity/quality, which will affect the level of wages by cohort.  Thus, in equation 
(A3-4), ε(a) captures the age-wage profile. 
Equations (A3-5) to (A3-11) determine output (Q), the savings rate of the 
economy (s), capital (K), total factor productivity (A), wages by age (w(a)), and the 
market interest rate rm.  The underlying assumption is that output is generated by a 
Cobb-Douglas function that incorporates human capital, physical capital, and total 
factor productivity.  The growth rate of output (g) is defined exogenously.  The savings 
rate of the economy is defined in a way that, in the steady state, the level of capital 
ensures that the market interest rate (the marginal productivity of capital) equals gτ, 
where τ is defined exogenously.  This last parameter is basically the ratio between the 
real market interest rate and the growth rate of GDP.  So, (1- α)/ (gτ) is the capital 
output ratio.  Wages (by age) and the market interest rate are then computed under the   43
assumption of full employment as the marginal productivity of labor (by age) and 
capital respectively.  In equations (A3-6) to (A3-11), α is the share of human capital in 
production. 
The evolution of the stocks of contributors (C), dormants (D; individuals who 
stopped contributing but have pension rights), and old-age pensioners (O) are given by 
equations (A3-12) to (A3-14).  We assume that all individuals in the labor force join the 
pension system at the beginning of the simulation (C(a,1)=L(a,1)) and that all new 
entrants to the labor force join the pension system at time t>1 (C(f,t)=L(f,t)).  From there 
the stock of contributors, dormants, and old-age retirees respond to survival 
probabilities l(.), dropping out probabilities d(.), reentry probabilities b(.), and the 
probability of continuing in the labor force instead of retiring v(a).  Notice that 
individuals who drop out of the pension system, do not drop out of the labor force.  In 
this model, these individuals continue working and earning a salary – they simply do 
not contribute. 
Finally, equations (A3-15), (A3-16), and (A3-17) give the dynamics of the capital 
value of the individual accounts and total pension expenditures for each age cohort, as 
the total reserves of the system.  The new symbols in these two equations are:  r*, the 
revalorization/indexation factor for wages/pensions (i.e., the internal rate of return on 
contributions); β, the contribution rate; G(a,t,i) the annuity factor at age a and time, that 
depends on the interest rate i (a policy parameter); and η which gives the rate of return 
on investments of the reserves relative to the market interest rate. 
 The notional capital value of pension accumulation over a period for a given age 
cohort incorporates the previously accumulated capital and its returns plus current 
contributions of the surviving and not yet retiring portion of the given age cohort. 
Equation (A3-15) takes into account that contributions are paid continuously throughout 
the year. The total pension amount paid to an age cohort evolves from period to period 
in accordance with (A3-16). The surviving portion of previously retired individuals of 
the cohort will receive pensions indexed by the IRR and the accumulated pension capital 
of new retirees is turned into annuities. The reserves of the pension system (A3-17) 
evolve over time in accordance with the returns/borrowing costs on the previously 
available reserves and the sum of the balances of current contributions and “newly   44
exchanged” pension annuities for all age cohorts. These balances are augmented by the 
investment returns/borrowing costs assessed on their continuous flows during the 
applicable year.   45
Box A3-1:  Model for Analysis of Robustness of Rules on IRRs 
Initial and total population by age-cohort: 
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Labor force by age cohort and human capital: 
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Output, productivity, wages and interest rate: 
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Contributors, dormants, and old-age pensioners: 
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Individual accounts by age cohort, total pensions by age-cohort, and total reserves: 
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Appendix 4 
 
The following figures compare the sensitivity/robustness of the Swedish 
automatic balance mechanism and that of the indexation mechanism of the 
proposal developed in this paper towards certain demographic shocks holding 
all other factors constant. The baseline simulation path scenario corresponds to 
state 1 in Table 1. The deviating paths are identified in the figure legends and 
they correspond to the alternative states defined in Table 1.  The sensitivity 
analysis towards population growth and survival patterns include one additional 
path each. All the simulations here apply annuity calculations with discounting.   47
Sensitivity Analysis – Population Growth Scenarios 
Evolution of the Reserves and Balance of the Pension System as a Share of the GDP, 
the Funding Ratio and Dynamic Internal Rate of Return of the Pension System under 
the Swedish Automatic Balance Mechanism and the New Indexation Proposal 
        Swedish automatic balance mechanism           new proposal 
   
     48
Sensitivity Analysis – Survival Pattern Scenarios 
Evolution of the Reserves and Balance of the Pension System as a Share of the GDP, 
the Funding Ratio and Dynamic Internal Rate of Return of the Pension System under 
the Swedish Automatic Balance Mechanism and the New Indexation Proposal 
          Swedish automatic balance mechanism           new proposal 
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Sensitivity Analysis – Retirement Probability Scenarios 
Evolution of the Reserves and Balance of the Pension System as a Share of the GDP, 
the Funding Ratio and Dynamic Internal Rate of Return of the Pension System under 
the Swedish Automatic Balance Mechanism and the New Indexation Proposal 
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Sensitivity Analysis – Drop-Out Probability Scenarios 
Evolution of the Reserves and Balance of the Pension System as a Share of the GDP, 
the Funding Ratio and Dynamic Internal Rate of Return of the Pension System under 
the Swedish Automatic Balance Mechanism and the New Indexation Proposal 
         Swedish automatic balance mechanism           new proposal 
   
   
   
   
 
 
 
 